In Culture and Value, Wittgenstein makes the statement that “life can force [the concept of God] on us” (WR 266). Wittgenstein thinks that people begin to believe in God not because they are rationally convinced that God exists by some sort of theological proof, but rather because of the experiences they have. With reference to the doctrine of predestination, Wittgenstein says that “[i]t is only permissible to write like this out of the most dreadful suffering” (WR 259). I would like to explore this idea of life and pain “forcing” the concept of God on someone in terms of the connections between this idea and the writings of Paul Tillich as well as the implications for the ways in which frames of reference can be altered.
In the statements quoted above, Wittgenstein seems quite clearly to be saying that religious belief is not an ordinary kind of belief, as when I “believe” that it is raining outside when someone walks in with a wet umbrella. Belief in God is not a matter of the rational assessment of evidence to come to a valid conclusion; rather, it is something that is “forced” upon us by experiences of great suffering. When one has an experience of great suffering that leads to a belief in God, it is “as though someone were first to let [one] see the hopelessness of [one’s] situation and then show [one] the means of rescue” (WR 263). In other words, when a painful experience makes us realize the fragility of our lives and happiness, belief in God becomes entirely plausible and perhaps even necessary to us.
This position on religion is quite similar to that of Paul Tillich. I am not sure whether Wittgenstein read Tillich’s writings, but it would be very interesting to know Wittgenstein’s opinion of them. Tillich believed that the best way to convince (force?) someone to believe in God was to make her aware of the “threat of non-being”, i.e., of the inevitability of her own death. Once a person was reduced to a state of terror at the thought of dying, she would be able to “ground” herself in God, who is the only thing “ultimate” enough to carry the weight of her existence. Thus, through experiences of suffering and the threat of non-being, Tillich, like Wittgenstein, believes that life can force the concept of God upon us.
But what does it mean for our lives when such a concept as God becomes probable to us because of the suffering that we have experienced? Wittgenstein seems to be certain that religious belief affects the entirety of our existence when he says that “a religious belief could only be something like a passionate commitment to a system of reference” (WR 263). In other words, belief in God changes that which stands fast for us, thereby altering the way we understand and live in the world.
Further, the fact that this shift in the frame of reference occurs as a result of an extremely emotional experience of suffering seems to suggest that the way in which systems of reference can change for an individual is not by means of rational persuasion, but rather by means of emotional experiences. Thus, our forms of life seem to be startlingly precarious in that our entire way of thinking and being could be altered at any moment by an experience of “the threat of non-being”, to use Tillich’s language. To me this situation seems to be a highly dangerous one because it leaves human beings as passive victims of whatever suffering someone else might choose to inflict on them. If Wittgenstein is right, so is Tillich, and all it takes is one encounter with “non-being” for us to be “forced” into a religious and self-sacrificial frame of reference.
It seems to me that the truly human thing to do would be to resist the force of life, however great our suffering might be, and to stay within a frame of reference that uses rational criteria for belief. As soon as we allow ourselves to be mindlessly driven by experiences, we are far less than human, and we are the perfect prey for people like Tillich.
In the statements quoted above, Wittgenstein seems quite clearly to be saying that religious belief is not an ordinary kind of belief, as when I “believe” that it is raining outside when someone walks in with a wet umbrella. Belief in God is not a matter of the rational assessment of evidence to come to a valid conclusion; rather, it is something that is “forced” upon us by experiences of great suffering. When one has an experience of great suffering that leads to a belief in God, it is “as though someone were first to let [one] see the hopelessness of [one’s] situation and then show [one] the means of rescue” (WR 263). In other words, when a painful experience makes us realize the fragility of our lives and happiness, belief in God becomes entirely plausible and perhaps even necessary to us.
This position on religion is quite similar to that of Paul Tillich. I am not sure whether Wittgenstein read Tillich’s writings, but it would be very interesting to know Wittgenstein’s opinion of them. Tillich believed that the best way to convince (force?) someone to believe in God was to make her aware of the “threat of non-being”, i.e., of the inevitability of her own death. Once a person was reduced to a state of terror at the thought of dying, she would be able to “ground” herself in God, who is the only thing “ultimate” enough to carry the weight of her existence. Thus, through experiences of suffering and the threat of non-being, Tillich, like Wittgenstein, believes that life can force the concept of God upon us.
But what does it mean for our lives when such a concept as God becomes probable to us because of the suffering that we have experienced? Wittgenstein seems to be certain that religious belief affects the entirety of our existence when he says that “a religious belief could only be something like a passionate commitment to a system of reference” (WR 263). In other words, belief in God changes that which stands fast for us, thereby altering the way we understand and live in the world.
Further, the fact that this shift in the frame of reference occurs as a result of an extremely emotional experience of suffering seems to suggest that the way in which systems of reference can change for an individual is not by means of rational persuasion, but rather by means of emotional experiences. Thus, our forms of life seem to be startlingly precarious in that our entire way of thinking and being could be altered at any moment by an experience of “the threat of non-being”, to use Tillich’s language. To me this situation seems to be a highly dangerous one because it leaves human beings as passive victims of whatever suffering someone else might choose to inflict on them. If Wittgenstein is right, so is Tillich, and all it takes is one encounter with “non-being” for us to be “forced” into a religious and self-sacrificial frame of reference.
It seems to me that the truly human thing to do would be to resist the force of life, however great our suffering might be, and to stay within a frame of reference that uses rational criteria for belief. As soon as we allow ourselves to be mindlessly driven by experiences, we are far less than human, and we are the perfect prey for people like Tillich.
3 comments:
I doubt Wittgenstein ever read Tillich -- "The Courage to Be" was written in 1952, and Wittgenstein died in 1951.
Wittgenstein was a fan of Kierkegaard, though. Called him "the greatest thinker of the 19th century." Kierkegaard and Tillich have their affinities, what with the existentialism and all.
I'm not sure that Wittgenstein associates suffering and God quite as closely as you seem to make him out to; what only becomes intelligible in cases of great suffering is not belief in God, but predestination. When life "forces the concept of God on us", it needn't be through suffering per se; finitude and suffering can come apart.
I'm not sure why you view Tillich & pals as something nefarious. Religious conversion isn't a mechanical process, but a matter of persuasion. Hilary Putnam has a good essay on this in "Renewing Philosophy", with reference to Wittgenstein.
Megan,
It's interesting what you say about being influenced to convert to a religion (change your frame of reference, as it were), about how it's someone less human if we are influenced by such mere "experiences" rather than by reason. See my blog post for more...http://kjwittgenstein.blogspot.com/
Are "mindlessness driven by experience" and rational assessment the only options?
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