Most of what I’ve been writing about Wittgenstein has been focused on very specific passages or points that he makes, so I’d like to step back a bit and comment on the general experience of reading and studying Wittgenstein’s writing.
The strange thing about reading Wittgenstein is that most of what one reads is not something that he considered publishable (with the obvious exception of the Tractatus). Some sections appear to be pieces of drafts that Wittgenstein might have at least considered publishing, but much of his writing seems to be his notes to and debates with himself. These sections can be extremely difficult to read because Wittgenstein often seems to be simply jotting down fragments as they occur to him, or writing himself reminders for things that he wants to think about later; many of the thoughts that he expresses are incomplete. I sometimes feel like I am having to do his philosophy for him when I am reading because I am the one who has to draw all of the connections; he never makes the connections for me. Interestingly, even Wittgenstein’s one published work, the Tractatus, has a certain air of incompleteness about it. In many ways it strikes the reader as an outline for a philosophic work rather than as the work itself. Yet, despite his tendency not to fully develop his thoughts, Wittgenstein is startlingly consistent throughout his notes on various subjects, and he seems always to connect back to and develop past claims that the reader thought he had forgotten.
One of the benefits to reading a philosopher’s unpublished writings is that there is a striking honesty and lack of ornamentation that can be quite refreshing. Sometimes when I am reading philosophers like Hegel or Sartre, I begin to feel like they are intentionally trying to make themselves confusing in order to appear profound or using ostentatious language when much simpler words would have done nicely. Wittgenstein’s honest struggle with philosophic issues is often quite endearing, and I never feel like he is “muddying the waters to make them appear deep”, as Nietzsche (rightly, in my opinion) accused Kant of doing.
I also think that the complete privacy of these unpublished writings has interesting implications. In his writings on private languages, Wittgenstein emphasizes again and again that no private language is possible; language is a public activity. Of course, Wittgenstein is not using a private language in his writings, but he is expressing thoughts that were meant only for his own private reflection. It is interesting to think about the fact that Wittgenstein so often feels driven to introduce an imaginary interlocutor in order to write down his ideas in the way that he wants to: language use seems, to him, to be a game best played with others.
Reading a philosopher’s private notes also provides a unique perspective of his method of doing philosophy. Wittgenstein’s tendency to write down thoughts and work them out gradually over time is very different from my own method. Usually, I do not write anything down at all until I feel that I have a complete thought; it is almost as though I do not give my thoughts the “privilege” of being recorded until they have earned it by completing themselves. Of course, the consequence of this practice is that I often forget my thoughts before they are complete, and then I never write them down at all. Perhaps reading Wittgenstein’s sometimes incomplete thoughts, as difficult as it may be at times, will expand and improve my own methods of doing philosophy.
The strange thing about reading Wittgenstein is that most of what one reads is not something that he considered publishable (with the obvious exception of the Tractatus). Some sections appear to be pieces of drafts that Wittgenstein might have at least considered publishing, but much of his writing seems to be his notes to and debates with himself. These sections can be extremely difficult to read because Wittgenstein often seems to be simply jotting down fragments as they occur to him, or writing himself reminders for things that he wants to think about later; many of the thoughts that he expresses are incomplete. I sometimes feel like I am having to do his philosophy for him when I am reading because I am the one who has to draw all of the connections; he never makes the connections for me. Interestingly, even Wittgenstein’s one published work, the Tractatus, has a certain air of incompleteness about it. In many ways it strikes the reader as an outline for a philosophic work rather than as the work itself. Yet, despite his tendency not to fully develop his thoughts, Wittgenstein is startlingly consistent throughout his notes on various subjects, and he seems always to connect back to and develop past claims that the reader thought he had forgotten.
One of the benefits to reading a philosopher’s unpublished writings is that there is a striking honesty and lack of ornamentation that can be quite refreshing. Sometimes when I am reading philosophers like Hegel or Sartre, I begin to feel like they are intentionally trying to make themselves confusing in order to appear profound or using ostentatious language when much simpler words would have done nicely. Wittgenstein’s honest struggle with philosophic issues is often quite endearing, and I never feel like he is “muddying the waters to make them appear deep”, as Nietzsche (rightly, in my opinion) accused Kant of doing.
I also think that the complete privacy of these unpublished writings has interesting implications. In his writings on private languages, Wittgenstein emphasizes again and again that no private language is possible; language is a public activity. Of course, Wittgenstein is not using a private language in his writings, but he is expressing thoughts that were meant only for his own private reflection. It is interesting to think about the fact that Wittgenstein so often feels driven to introduce an imaginary interlocutor in order to write down his ideas in the way that he wants to: language use seems, to him, to be a game best played with others.
Reading a philosopher’s private notes also provides a unique perspective of his method of doing philosophy. Wittgenstein’s tendency to write down thoughts and work them out gradually over time is very different from my own method. Usually, I do not write anything down at all until I feel that I have a complete thought; it is almost as though I do not give my thoughts the “privilege” of being recorded until they have earned it by completing themselves. Of course, the consequence of this practice is that I often forget my thoughts before they are complete, and then I never write them down at all. Perhaps reading Wittgenstein’s sometimes incomplete thoughts, as difficult as it may be at times, will expand and improve my own methods of doing philosophy.
1 comment:
Megan,
"I sometimes feel like I am having to do his philosophy for him when I am reading because I am the one who has to draw all of the connections; he never makes the connections for me".
One may say that Wittgenstein refrains from speech to ensure the effectivness of his words. He speaks as little as possible out of pedagogical concern in order to allow the other to discover by herself. It is a rhetorical commonplace in the later thought that the important thing is not to speak but to act (he says as much somewhere in RFM). On the other hand, Wittgenstein later deplored his inability to work out his ideas into a sustained line of argument. The result is that his work often pursues philosophical clarity in an opaque manner, making his readers feel like slaves.
Simon
Post a Comment