Wittgenstein's Definition of Philosophy

According to Wittgenstein, “The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts” (Tractatus 4.112). Wittgenstein seems to embrace this extremely limited definition of philosophy as a result of his belief that there are very few things that language can properly express: since we cannot even talk about things like ethics and aesthetics, philosophy should limit itself to clarifying our pictures of those few things about which we actually can speak. In order to evaluate Wittgenstein’s limited definition of philosophy, I will critically consider his claims about the unspeakability of something that I and many others normally consider to be an important part of the object of philosophy: ethics.

Wittgenstein states quite clearly that ethics cannot be spoken of because value cannot lie within the realm of fact, i.e., within the realm of which we can speak. “If there is a value which is of value, it must lie outside all happening and being-so” because meaning and purpose cannot be a part of the “accidental” realm of fact (Tractatus 6.41). This idea of ethics, however, is misguided because it sees value as something that must “exist” on its own, as a sort of agent that actively “gives” meaning to the otherwise accidental facts. Value is not something that exists independently; rather, it exists as a judgment of a human being about those accidental facts. Value cannot exist without a human mind who judges something as valuable by some standard that she has chosen. By this definition, value is derived from the things that exist by human beings rather than having to exist on its own. In fact, value that existed independently would not really be value because it would not be of value to anyone in particular: value without a valuer is an empty concept. Thus, of course it is impossible for Wittgenstein to talk about a sort of value that exists independently: no such thing is actually or even possibly real.

If value is derived from the things that exist and that can be described by propositions, it seems that we would be able to talk about it after all. We could use one proposition to describe a particular fact, and then we could use another to describe the way in which that fact makes our lives better or allows us to survive. In other words, value is logical. It is based on facts and logic, and thus it is something that can be both thought and spoken about. This understanding of value allows us to talk about value without having to force language to transcend its own bounds in any way.

If value can, in fact, be spoken of, it seems that it is far too important a matter to be excluded from the object of philosophy. Since Wittgenstein is so concerned about philosophy as a source of clarity, it seems that he would have wanted philosophy to clarify which things are truly valuable to individuals and which are not. It seems to me that if Wittgenstein had realized that value is connected directly to facts and is therefore not transcendental, he would have included ethics as an important part of philosophy.

To amend Wittgenstein’s famous line: Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must think a little bit harder and make sure one really understands what is going on.