Sunday, September 9, 2007

"External" Descriptions

In his “Rejection of Logical Atomism”, Wittgenstein states “that Φ(x) must be an external description of x” in order for something to be actually described in the way that logical atomism requires (35). In other words, one must always be able to distinguish the subject from the predicate in order for the utterance to be a proper and logical one.

The example that Wittgenstein offers as support for his statement is that, upon hearing a loud noise, one could ask, “‘Was that thunder, or gunfire?’” but not “‘Was that a noise?’” because to ask whether ‘that’ was a noise when ‘that’ refers to a noise is to ask, non-sensically, whether a noise was a noise (35). In other words, the predicate Noise(x) is not external to x in this case.

It seems to me, however, that the impropriety of the question “Was that a noise?” stems not from the fact that the predicate is internal to the subject, but rather from the fact that the predicate’s applicability to the subject is self-evident in any situation in which the question could be understood. The same problem arises from the question, “Was the shooting star in the sky?” because it is self-evident that any shooting star would have to be in the sky. However, the fact that the shooting star was in the sky is certainly external to the shooting star itself; its location is not an internal property.

Further, there are many cases in which it can be useful and important to predicate something of an object that is internal to the object. For instance, it might at some point be important for me to say that the atomic number of gold is 79 because I am speaking to someone who is not aware of that fact. Thus, even though that predicate is internal to the nature of gold, it can be stated meaningfully and properly.

So, it is not whether a predicate is internal or external to the subject but rather whether it is empirically self-evident or not that determines whether it can be properly predicated of the subject.

2 comments:

BF said...

Would a star be a star if it were not in the sky?
Consider that LW seeks to identify (or clarify) not the essences of things but the grammatical relations between terms. That may put your examples of the star and the atomic # of gold in a different light.

Megan said...

If Wittgenstein wants to talk about what predicates are internal or external to a subject, he must necessarily move from an analysis of grammatical relations to an an analysis of the actual meaning of the terms. We must know what a term means in order to know whether a given predicate is external or internal, and understanding a term's meaning means understanding the essence of that to which it refers.